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Recent Developments

In re Adoption/Guardianship, No. T97036005
Children Have a Statutory Right to a Hearing on the Merits for a Petition to
Terminate Parental Rights
By Meredith Stein

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a child
who is the subject of a termination of
parental rights petition, and makes a
timely objection thereto, is entitled to
a hearing on the petition's merits. In

re Adoption/Guardianship, No.
T97036005, 358 Md. 1, 746 A.2d
379 (2000). In a consolidated case,
four Children In Need of Assistance
(CINA) who through counsel filed
timely appeals against the decision to
terminate their natural parents' rights,
were deemed by the court to be
parties to the termination petitions. As
such, the children were entitled to
representation at the petition hearings,
as well as an opportunity to be heard
on the petition's merits.
Jamal L., Dimitri D., lesha E.,
and Christopher C. were all foster
children who had been committed to
the care of the Baltimore City
Department of Social Services
(BCDSS). Each had been previously
adjudicated a CINA, pursuant to
section 3-812 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article of the
Annotated Code of Maryland (1973,
1998 Repl. Vol. 1999 Supp.). A
petition for "guardianship with the right
to consent to adoption or long-term
care short of adoption" was filed by
BCDSS on the children's behalf.
BCDSS's requests were granted by
the trial court, thereby terminating
parental rights to the children either

30.2 U. Bait L.F. 78

by operation oflaw or consent. The
trial court had denied each child's
request for hearings on the merits of
the petition.
The first child, Jamal L.,
requested a hearing on the merits
because he believed his permanency
plan through BCDSS was to be
returned to his natural mother. Jamal
requested, in the alternative, the case
be held sub curia pending a decision
of the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland on In re Adoption/
GuardianshipNo. T97036005, No.
783, Sept. Term, 1998 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. Feb. 10, 1999). The
second child, Dimitri D. requested a
postponement and a trial on the merits
based on evidence that there was a
connection between him and his father
and his desire to be reunited with his
mother. The postponement was
denied. After which, lesha E.
requested a trial on the merits to show
a family bond that had formed
between herself and her parents and
siblings through frequent contact. The
circuit court denied lesha' s request for
a hearing on the merits for two
reasons: 1) her parents consented to
termination by operation oflaw and;
2) lesha lacked standing for a trial on
the merits. Finally, Christopher C.
requested a postponement to attempt
to give notice and obtain consent from
his absentee father and for the
opportunity to have Christopher's

views on the petition heard. The
circuit court denied the request and
granted BCDSS' s petition to waive
notice to Christopher's father and
guardianship. Upon timely appeal to
the court of special appeals, an
unpublished opinion was issued
affirming the circuit court's decision
holding that the denial of
postponement was not an abuse of
discretion. In each child's case, a
timely objection to the circuit court's
decision was filed, and a writ of
certiorari was granted by the Court
of Appeals ofMaryland to decide the
rights of the children in Termination
of Parental Rights Proceedings.
The court began its analysis by
determining whether a child is
considered a party to the petition for
termination. In re Adoption/

Guardianship, No. T97036005,
358 Md. 1, 12, 746 A.2d"379, 385.
A "party" to the petition, as defmed
by section 3-80 1(r) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article of the
Annotated Code of Maryland,
"includes a child who is the subject
of a petition, [and] the child's parent,
guardian or custodian." Id. at 1314, 746 A.2d at 385-86. To
substantiate this definition, the court
read section 3-804(a)'s plain
language defining "party" to include
a child, previously adjudicated a
CINA, who is the subject of a
termination of parental rights
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proceeding and deemed to be under
the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.
ld., 746 A.2d at 385-86. The court
opined that it would be illogical to
allow the child to be a party in CINA
proceedings, which commits them to
BCDSS'scustody, but not allow him
to be a party in guardianship
proceedings. ld. at 15, 746 A.2d at
386-87.
The court also noted that under
Maryland common law, a party to an
action, whose rights are to be
affected, has the right to be heard. ld.
at 16-17, 746 A.2dat 387. Thecourt
determined that Maryland law affords
this privilege statutorily in termination
of parental rights hearings. ld. The
court interpreted these laws to extend
to children by looking to the child's
right to counsel, notice ofthe hearing,
and the opportunity to object. ld.
Section 3-821(a) ofthe Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article provides
that "a party is entitled to the
assistance of counsel at every stage
of any proceeding under Subtitle 8,
Juvenile Causes." Moreover, ifread
in conjunction with section 3804(a)(2), this privilege also applies
to termination of parental rights
hearings. ld. The court, therefore,
concluded that the right to
representation by counsel implies the
right to be heard. ld. at 17-18, 746
A.2d at 388.
Section 5-323(a)(1)(iv) of the
Family Law Article of the Annotated
Code of Maryland requires separate
counsel to be supplied for the child in
an involuntary termination of parental
rights proceeding. Id. The court
equated this right of the child to the
parental right to representation by

counsel and the right to be heard.
Therefore, the child should also have
the right to an evidentiary hearing and
the right to be heard. Id. Without
this interpretation, the court held, the
role of counsel to the child would
serve little or no purpose. Id. at 18,
746 A.2d at 388.
The court recognized the fact
that notice to the attorney representing
a child in CINA hearings must be
given pursuant to section 5322(a)(1)(ii)(2) ofthe Family Law
Article. ld. Further, this requirement
includes that a copy ofthe petition and
cause for an action for guardianship
to be given to the same attorney,
pursuantto Rule 9-1 05(f). ld. These
provisions provide an opportunity for
objection on behalf of the child.
Without objecting, the attorney for the
child is considered to have consented
to the guardianship. ld. at 19, 746
A.2d at 388. Moreover, Rule 9107(a), as noted by the court,
provides that "any person having a
right to participate in a proceeding for
adoption or guardianship may file a
notice of objection to the adoption or
guardianship." ld. The purpose of
the party's right to notice and right to
object, as seen in Rule 9-109(a), is
to enable that party an opportunity to
be heard on the merits. ld. at19, 746
A.2d at 388-89. Based on this
statutory interpretation, the court of
appeals concluded that because the
child is considered a party to a
guardianship action, he or she has a
right to counsel, a right to notice of
the petition, and finally, a right to be
heard, as indicated by the Family Law
Article and the Maryland Rules. ld.
at 19-20, 746 A.2d at 389.

Finally, the court noted that the
standards to comply with when ruling
on a guardianship petition are "the
best interests of a child," as codified
in Rule 9-1 09(b) and section 5-313
of the Family Law Article. ld. at 22,
746 A.2d at 390. Rule 9-109(b)
points to Section 5-3l3, which sets
out a detailed list offactors which must
be established by clear and convincing
evidence. ld. As such, the court
concluded that in a guardianship
hearing, Rule 9-109 mandates that the
factors in Section 5-313 must always
be considered by the court. ld. at 2223, 746 A.2d at 390-91.
Furthermore, the hearing record must
reflect the consideration of all the
statutorilyrequiredfactors. Id. at23,
746 A.2d at 391.
The Court of Appeals of
Maryland concluded that the burden
imposed by requiring the additional
safeguard of an evidentiary hearing is
minimal to ensure that the best
interests ofthe child are protected. ld.
at 25, 746 A.2d at 392. A child has
a statutory right as a party to a
guardianship hearing to be heard, and
therefore, with timely objection on the
child's behalf, the child is entitled to
an evidentiary hearing on the merits
of his or her case.
The decision from the Court of
Appeals of Maryland on this
compilation of cases opens many
doors and opportunities for children
in need of assitance in Maryland
juvenile law, as it reshapes the way
children are viewed in guardianship
and adoption proceedings.
Specifically, children who are
threatened with being permanently
separated from their natural parents
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now have an opportunity to voice
concerns about how their
guardianships are to be handled. The
practitioner should be aware that this
important decision affects his or her
duty to represent children in these
proceedings. A more active role for
both child and practitioner in
guardianship and adoption
proceedings has resulted. The goal is
to help ensure what is in the best
interests of the child by investigating
thoroughly, including considering the
concerns of the child. Finally, since
this may affect the speed at which
children are filtered through the social
service system, due to the possibility
of an extra step in the process, the
social service system must scrutinize
their petition process more closely.
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